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Abstract—The European Union has committed itself to 
sourcing 20% of its energy from renewables by 2020. Britain’s 
excellent wind resource is expected to make a significant 
contribution to this target, not least from Scotland and the north 
of England. However, exploitation of this resource requires 
appropriate and timely development of the GB electricity 
transmission system. This depends on appropriate market signals 
that communicate the need for transmission investment, 
something that many in the industry in Britain believe current 
arrangements do not adequately provide. This paper describes a 
number of proposals currently under discussion, outlines their 
interactions and highlights some of the key issues currently being 
debated. 
Index Terms—transmission development, system access, wind 
generation. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Poznan in 2008, European Union leaders committed the 
EU to meeting 20% of its energy needs from renewable 
sources by 2020. Great Britain is recognised having one of the 
best wind energy resources in Europe. The UK and Scottish 
governments are committed to exploiting this resource in 
order to contribute towards meeting a target in Scotland of 
50% of electricity and, in the UK, an aspiration of 20% of 
energy from renewables by 2020. To promote the 
development of renewable generation, a ‘renewables 
obligation’ (RO) has been established that requires electricity 
retailers to source a set percentage of the electricity they 
supply from renewables, demonstrated by obtaining the 
requisite number of ‘renewable obligation certificates’ 
(ROCs) in each year either from generators or bought in 
auctions [1]. Alternatively, they may enter into an end of year 
reconciliation in which those retailers not meeting their 
obligation pay a buy out price into a pot that is then 
redistributed among those parties that do. 
The best wind load factors in Britain can generally be 
found in the north – Scotland and the north of England – or 
offshore (fig. 1). In view of the high costs and risks associated 
with offshore wind farm development, operation and 
maintenance, onshore wind farm development in the north has 
attracted most interest. Such interest was stated by the Office 
of Gas and Electricity Markets in Britain – Ofgem – to have 
been among the primary motivations for reform of the 
electricity market in Britain in 2005. Specifically, one of the 
cited benefits of the ‘British Electricity Trading and 
Transmission Arrangements’ (BETTA) was to enable 
generators in Scotland to gain access to customers in England 
and Wales [3].  
The main effect of BETTA was to extend the ‘New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements’ (NETA) in England and 
Wales to Scotland and to open up access to transfers of power 
across the circuits interconnecting Scotland and England. 
 
 
Fig. 1: annual average wind speeds in the UK [2] 
 
Previously, access to a pre-determined nominal capacity on 
the circuits interconnecting Scotland and England had been 
auctioned by the joint owners – Scottish Power Transmission 
and National Grid. Now, by being deemed to be part of the 
single GB transmission system, access would be governed by 
the same arrangements as applied in England and Wales, 
which broadly meant that transmission system users would be 
permitted to connect to the system and to have firm rights to 
use it provided the system was developed in accordance with 
the design criteria of the ‘Security and Quality of Supply 
Standard’ (SQSS). The most pertinent implication of this is 
that where additional generation means transfers of power 
across any boundary that might be drawn on the ‘main 
interconnected transmission system’ (MITS) exceed the 
secure capability of that boundary, as determined in 
accordance with what is now the GB SQSS [4], that additional 
generation is not permitted to connect until appropriate 
reinforcements of the system have been carried out (“invest 
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and connect”). However, under the terms of BETTA, existing 
generators in Scotland and those that applied for new 
connections before December 31 2004 were deemed to have 
firm rights (provided local connection works were completed) 
in spite of the boundary between Scotland and England being 
non-compliant with the GB SQSS. (Developers have since 
been offered the right to connect 13.5GW of wind generation 
to the GB transmission system by 2015. 2GW had connected 
by September 2008 in a system with a peak demand of around 
62GW [5]). 
At the same time as BETTA was being implemented, it 
was recognised that the SQSS criteria determining the 
minimum transfer capability on boundaries of the MITS had 
been developed for a system assumed to have only thermal 
generation. It was also recognised that such criteria were 
unlikely to be suitable for a system with a mix of generating 
plant including wind. Thus, a review of the MITS design 
criteria was initiated. (The issues that were due to be 
considered by that review were described in a paper to the 
main CIGRE Paris session in 2006 [6]).  
In the meantime, while some doubt was being cast on the 
appropriateness of some aspects of the existing MITS criteria, 
the three GB transmission owners and the GB system operator 
– the GB ‘transmission licensees’ – set about articulating a 
cost-benefit argument for reinforcement of the system in the 
north of Britain, in particular within Scotland, across the 
boundary with England and in the north east and north west of 
England. This was based on the value of reinforcements in 
reducing the cost of constraint of exports of power out of 
Scotland [7]. A number of consultations were conducted by 
Ofgem to invite industry views on the appropriateness of the 
licensees’ proposals. Among the questions on which it was 
difficult to reach a consensus were:  
• what should be assumed about the future ‘generation 
background’ in Scotland, namely what set of new 
generators would connect and which existing generators, 
some of which were quite old, would remain connected 
and operational; and 
• what should be assumed about the total cost of 
constraints in each year of operation, in particular the net 
price of each MWh of re-despatch in the ‘balancing 
mechanism’? 
Some responses to those consultations and to subsequent 
consultations by the UK government as part of its Energy 
Review in 2006 [8] voiced an opinion that uncertainties about 
the above questions would be resolved by reform of 
transmission access arrangements, in particular to oblige 
greater user commitment to paying future costs of 
transmission infrastructure and enabling a clearer ‘market-
driven’ signal of the value of transfer capability across 
different parts of the system [9]. 
This paper outlines developments to date in review of the 
GB SQSS and in the ‘transmission access review’ (TAR) in 
Britain. The links between the two processes are discussed 
and, while developments are currently quite fast, suggests the 
prospects apparent at time of writing, not least in respect of 
facilitating the connection and utilisation of renewable 
generation. It begins by describing the current access 
arrangements, electricity trading structure and main security 
criteria. 
II.  CURRENT ACCESS ARRANGEMENTS 
The terms under which potential transmission users apply 
for and the transmission system operator grants rights to 
connect to and use the system are laid out in the ‘Connection 
and Use of System Code’ (CUSC) [10]. New users submit an 
application to the GB system operator (National Grid 
Electricity Transmission – NGET) and must be made an offer 
within 3 months of receipt of that application. The offer is for 
firm access rights (i.e. curtailment of access attracts some 
form of financial compensation) but, if the new connection 
would entail the system being non-compliant with the design 
criteria of the GB SQSS, it also outlines the reinforcements 
that should be completed before access will be granted. These 
are, broadly, ‘connection works’, user-specific infrastructure 
works and wider infrastructure works, the approach of first 
ensuring compliance with the SQSS being known colloquially 
as “invest and connect”. For the first two categories, the user 
is required to provide some financial securities against the 
costs of the works. This is so that, if the user subsequently 
withdraws from the agreement, neither the relevant 
transmission owner nor other transmission users are obliged 
to carry the cost of any of the new assets that are 
consequently stranded. If the user goes ahead and connects 
once the works are completed, the securities are not used and 
the user pays connection and use of system charges in the 
normal way1. However, while the connection offer quotes a 
likely date of completion of the transmission works, neither 
the transmission owner (which provides the works) nor the 
system operator (with which the user has their agreement) is 
obliged to provide access on that date. This is defended by the 
transmission licensees on the grounds that the main risk to 
completion of the works is that of obtaining the necessary 
planning consents, which they argue is largely outside of their 
control. (Ofgem, on the other hand, has expressed its wish 
that, instead, access rights are granted within a certain period 
of the user’s acceptance of an offer [9]. This arrangement is 
yet to be implemented and is being considered as part of the 
TAR process that will be described presently). 
Once a user has access rights – expressed for generators 
and owners of interconnectors that export power onto the GB 
transmission system as the ‘transmission entry capacity’ 
(TEC) that they hold – they may be held in perpetuity while 
connection and use of system charges continue to be paid. 
The user need only provide 5 days’ notice of an intention to 
relinquish their rights and no longer to pay the associated 
                                                          
1 Connection charges cover the cost of the connection assets – designated in 
Britain in a rather shallow manner – and their maintenance, the capital costs 
depreciated over 40 years. Use of system charges are levied in accordance with a 
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charges. In respect of new users holding offers to connect in 
some future year, any financial liability only begins once the 
reinforcement works for which they have been required to 
provide securities actually begin. Before that, they can change 
their connection date, the only cost being that of making the 
application for the modification of their connection 
agreement. 
The above arrangement allows existing holders of rights – 
whether they are already connected or are due to connect at 
some future time – always to retain the option of exercising 
their rights at minimum risk. However, in cases where 
physical transmission capacity is limited, it can be seen as an 
obstacle to other users obtaining rights. Later applicants’ 
connections are likely to be made subject to more significant, 
costly and time-consuming system reinforcements than those 
specified in existing connection agreements. This can seem 
perverse in cases where the users holding those existing rights 
are not actually connected and are not paying anything for 
those rights. (It has been suggested that priority should be 
given to those users that have applied to connect first with the 
more extensive reinforcements made conditions of those 
connecting later, but Ofgem is understood to have expressed 
the wish that there is no discrimination between users on a 
basis of connection date). 
The above situation, the interest in development of wind 
generation in Scotland, the limited capacity of the system to 
transfer power southwards across Scotland and onwards into 
England, the approach of “invest and connect” and various 
delays in achieving reinforcements of the MITS in Scotland 
and the north of England have led to a significant queue for 
access. (See, for example, [7] for a description of the 
reinforcements currently in train and [11] for further 
proposals). This, in turn, has led the UK government to see 
the current arrangements as a major threat to the achievement 
of its renewables targets [8]. Part of the debate about current 
arrangements has concerned the following question: if 
connection of renewable generation is being delayed for 
system reinforcements, how sure can we be that those 
reinforcements are really necessary? It is in this context that 
revision of the GB SQSS is receiving considerable attention. 
III.  THE DESIGN CRITERIA OF THE GB SECURITY AND QUALITY 
OF SUPPLY STANDARD 
The GB SQSS contains four main sets of criteria [4]: for 
design of generation connections; for design of demand 
connections; for the design of the main interconnected 
transmission system (MITS); and for operation of the 
transmission system. (Further sections concern an 
introduction, voltage limits, terms and definitions and 
supporting appendices). The various design criteria are 
intended to ensure that sufficient assets are provided to allow 
the system to be operated in accordance with the operating 
criteria, including while maintenance and construction 
                                                                                                     
zonal tariff administered by NGET and designed to be, broadly speaking, cost 
reflective. The total charge is split between generation and demand. 
outages are taken. For example, generation connections 
should be such that single events do not lead to the need for 
more than a certain amount of frequency response and reserve 
to be held for the system to be kept within statutory frequency 
limits; and demand connections should be such that the 
largest demand groups continue to be supplied after the 
occurrence of single unplanned outage events while smaller 
groups might suffer some loss of supply for some limited 
period of time. 
The GB SQSS evolved from a set of guidelines – 
‘standards’ – used by the former state-owned transmission 
and generation utility, the Central Electricity Generating 
Board (CEGB). At the time of privatisation in 1990, these 
guidelines were set down as a licence condition of the new 
National Grid Company in England and Wales and the 
company made liable to a fine in the event of failure to 
comply. At the same time, a review of the standards was 
initiated. This led, in 1999, to incorporation of the NGC 
Security and Quality of Supply Standard into National Grid 
Company’s licence. For the introduction of BETTA in 2005, 
the NGC SQSS was further developed into the GB SQSS, a 
conformance of the NGC SQSS with two Scottish 
transmission licensees’ standards [12]. 
The original basis of the design criteria for the MITS 
predated even the CEGB standards. It was motivated by the 
specification of that transmission capacity which should be 
provided to interconnect different areas to provide access to 
‘spare’ generation in a neighbouring area in the event of a 
shortage in the local area due either to generation 
unavailability or unusually high demand. The extent of the 
‘interconnection allowance’ was based on flows observed 
across a 5 year period (at a time when areas were normally 
operated to be self-sufficient, i.e. the ‘planned’ transfers were 
zero), effectively the result of a statistical experiment 
conducted to characterise a stochastic problem. However, 
some time in the 1960s as central planning of generation 
determined that coal fields in the north of England and 
nuclear power around the coast should be used for electrical 
energy, bulk transfers of power became normal and the basic 
MITS design criterion changed to the accommodation of a 
‘planned transfer’ consequential to these bulk flows with an 
additional margin – the ‘interconnection allowance’ – for 
demand uncertainty and variation in availability of generation. 
Following both privatisation and the introduction of both 
the NGC SQSS and GB SQSS, the above fundamental MITS 
design criterion was retained, albeit with the ‘background’ of 
generation capacity from which the ‘planned transfers’ are 
calculated no longer being centrally planned but that delivered 
by the market and regarded by a transmission planner as 
‘contributory’. Furthermore, in line with previous planning 
practice, no distinction is made between different 
‘contributory’ generators when calculating the ‘planned 
transfer’ that, when added to the relevant ‘interconnection 
allowance’, determines the minimum transfer capability 
across a boundary delineating any two areas of the system at 
time of system peak demand. However, this minimum – in 
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common with the group export capabilities specified in the 
generation connection standard – was not designed to deliver 
a ‘constraint free’ system. In other words, it was assumed that 
generation capacity in an exporting area would, to some 
extent, ‘share’ the transmission capacity out of the area. In 
operational timescales, if the majority of generation in a 
particular exporting area is available and running, it leads to a 
need for the system operator to take action to reduce output in 
that area and replace it with increased output in the importing 
area. 
Two main problems with the implementation of the current 
rule might be highlighted:  
1. the ‘interconnection allowance’, used mainly to cater for 
unavailability of generation, was predicated on the 
characteristics of thermal generation; the frequency and 
extent of unavailability of wind generation is very 
different. 
2. the extent to which wind generation – which has a 
maximum capacity factor generally significantly lower 
than that of thermal generation – on average ‘needs’ a 
certain amount of transmission capacity for export 
purposes and ‘shares’ it with other generation is very 
different from that of a similar capacity of thermal 
generation. 
The net result in the view of some industry observers in 
Britain (see, for example, [13]) is that the minimum 
transmission capability specified by the ‘planned transfer + 
interconnection allowance’ rule in the SQSS is too high (thus 
contributing to excessive reinforcement and unnecessary 
delay to the connection of renewables) for an exporting area 
containing a significant volume of wind generation and should 
be discarded. Instead, it has been argued that the SQSS’s 
present facility for the justification of additional transmission 
capacity over and above the ‘deterministic’ minimum by 
reference to cost-benefit analysis should be the sole 
determinant of MITS capacity. This cost-benefit analysis is 
based on minimisation of the total cost of transmission, i.e. 
when the marginal cost of transmission facilities equals the 
marginal value of the sum of the cost of system operation 
(including response, reserve and losses) and the ‘cost’ of 
demand reduction or interruption. In this appraisal, much 
clearly depends on how the system is operated and what the 
system operator has to pay for actions. This, in turn, depends 
both on the operating criteria of the SQSS and the trading 
arrangements, which are briefly described in the next sections. 
IV.  TRADING ARRANGEMENTS IN BRITAIN 
The trading arrangements in Great Britain, first introduced 
for England and Wales in 2000 and then extended to Scotland 
in 2005, are based around bilateral contracts between 
generators and retailers – ‘suppliers’ – leading to declaration 
to a ‘balancing mechanism’ (BM) by generation and supplier 
companies of ‘final physical notifications’ (FPNs) for each of 
their ‘balancing mechanism units’ (BMUs) at ‘gate closure’ 
an hour before the start of a given settlement period. (Each 
settlement period lasts half-an-hour). (See, for example, [14].) 
From that point on, the system operator – which operates the 
BM – has responsibility for balancing the system in terms of 
generation and demand and for ensuring its operation is 
secure in the context of the operating criteria of the SQSS. In 
order to achieve that, they take actions such as acceptance of 
‘offers’ from generators to increase output or from demand to 
reduce consumption and acceptance of ‘bids’ from generators 
to reduce output or (rather unusually) demand to increase 
consumption. The cost of such actions contributes towards the 
total cost of ‘balancing services’. Other balancing services 
include the availability of frequency response, reserve, 
reactive power and black start capability. 
The system operator is under an incentive – the ‘Balancing 
Services Incentive Scheme’ – to manage balancing costs in 
the overall interests of all users which, through the ‘Balancing 
Services Use of System’ (BSUoS) charge, meet the system 
operator’s costs. 
V.  SYSTEM SECURITY IN OPERATIONAL TIMESCALES 
The need for balancing actions to secure the system clearly 
depends on what FPNs are submitted by both generators and 
suppliers (and whether they succeed in delivering them), on 
the physical transmission capacity that is available and on the 
level of security that should be provided. In Britain, 
notwithstanding that smaller demand groups do not need to be 
fully secured, since the vast majority of the 275kV and 400kV 
system is built as double circuit overhead lines, this is 
generally double circuit security against whatever pattern of 
planned outages is prevailing, a convention sometimes termed 
N’-D security. 
Some recent analysis suggests that, depending on what is 
assumed for the ‘value of lost load’ and the degree to which a 
‘perfect’ amount of load might be shed under conditions of 
system inadequacy, N’-D security is not justified by the value 
consumers put on continuity of electricity supply, by the cost 
of constraints or by the frequency with which double circuit 
fault outages occur under ‘normal’ weather conditions [15]. 
On the other hand, in ‘adverse’ weather when the likelihood 
of a double circuit fault outage is relatively high, it might be. 
This may be compared with academic work in the 1990s when 
a computational procedure was developed that would allow 
operational planners to identify the overall benefit of different 
plans in respect of probabilities of unplanned events and 
consequences of events in terms of re-despatch of generation 
or interruption of load [16]. In contrast to [16] which only 
provided a comparative evaluation of cost and benefit, in [15] 
an outline and, at time of writing, not fully developed 
procedure is suggested for an optimisation in which the cost 
of making different levels of response and reserve available 
plays a key part (fig. 2). (Although it might seem that the GB 
SQSS is ‘all or nothing’ in terms of security provision, it does 
in fact include scope to relax from N’-D security even though 
it might also be argued that this is insufficiently well 
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exploited. The GB SQSS also implicitly recognises different 
levels of risk in terms of consequences of events.) 
Fig. 2: Optimisation of system operation: balancing of costs of preventive and 
corrective actions 
While the system operator has some control over the 
timing of planned transmission outages (though less over their 
frequency and duration), the FPNs and bid and offer prices 
are determined by others. In the medium term, while some 
contract might be struck with a generator to ensure 
availability at key times (in particular, when transmission 
outages are taken) or with large consumers for interruptible 
load, these must be viewed as uncertain (fig. 3).  
In the long term when, in a cost-benefit analysis, balancing 
costs must be estimated to establish the value of potential 
system reinforcements, they must be regarded as highly 
uncertain, no matter that, in a perfect market, differences 
between generator bids and offers should – in theory – reflect 
the relative prices of fuel. Ofgem currently regards the cost of 
constraints as excessive having risen from £84m in 2005/6 to 
a forecast level of over £260m for 2009/10 [18]. That the cost 
of constraints is uncertain and high might be regarded as 
indicative of market power [19], failure to levy BSUoS 
charges on those parties that give rise to the greatest part of 
balancing service costs, or of failure to reflect the value of 
access rights in areas with limited transmission capacity so 
that – relative to that transmission capacity – excessive rights 
are applied for and granted.  
The next section summarises proposals under 
consideration at time of writing to better manage access in the 
longer term. 
Fig. 3: volatility of the day ahead power price in Britain  (April 2003-November 
2008) [17] 
VI.  TRANSMISSION ACCESS REFORM 
Processes for the auction of rights of access to a 
transmission system have been implemented in various parts 
of the world and have long been discussed in Britain. In its 
Energy White Paper of 2007, the UK government initiated a 
major review of transmission access in Britain that included 
among its options auctioning of rights with the main cited 
purpose being the faster facilitation of connection of 
renewables and enduring arrangements permitting 
identification of new transmission infrastructure necessary to 
meet the UK’s share of the 2020 EU renewable energy targets 
[9].  
The main measures considered have been “connect and 
manage”, the release of short-term rights, the facility for 
generators to ‘overrun’ their allocated rights, a mechanism by 
which generators might share rights, modifications to existing 
long-term access rights provision and radical reform of long-
term access rights where they are acquired through an auction 
process. 
Each of the aforementioned measures would require some 
change to the ‘Connection and Use of System Code’ (CUSC). 
This might be achieved by any CUSC signatory, including the 
system operator (National Grid), bringing forward a CUSC 
amendment proposal. A working group is then formed from 
among CUSC signatories to consider the proposal and to 
report on whether or not it meets the objectives of the CUSC 
better than current arrangements. The working group’s report 
is consulted on and the various responses considered by the 
CUSC Panel which makes a final recommendation to Ofgem. 
Ofgem then conducts its own consultation in which it 
expresses its own view on the proposed amendment and seeks 
comments. Finally, Ofgem has the power to approve – or 
decline to approve – proposed amendments. 
The various access reform measures have been articulated 
as a set of different CUSC amendment proposals as 
summarised in Table 1. The Table also shows the CUSC 
Panel responses to them. 
The CUSC Panel responses to the proposals summarised in 
Table 1 show that the industry has a clear appetite for greater 
flexibility in short-term access. At present, while the 
transmission system is not designed to be constraint free 
against a given ‘background’ of generation capacity, there will 
be times during a year, particularly off-peak, when ‘spare’ 
transmission capacity will be available. This should be 
especially apparent when some power stations are on planned 
outage – the rights these stations hold might be made 
available to others although it is normal for the transmission 
owners to schedule transmission outages around exporting 
groups at times of generation outage so the amount of short-
term access that can be provided might be limited. On the 
other hand, generating companies with a portfolio of plant 
utilising different technologies will seek to share access as 
straightforwardly as possible so as to use wind generation to 
satisfy bilateral energy contracts when wind speeds are high 
and thermal generation at other times. 
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TABLE 1 – CUSC AMENDMENT PROPOSALS RELATED TO TRANSMISSION ACCESS 
REFORM 
 
Label Description CUSC Panel 
response 
CAP161 Short-term access – auctions of available 
transmission capacity n weeks ahead for 1 week of 
rights or m days ahead for 1 day of access 
Approved 
CAP162 Entry capacity overrun – after the event charging 
for generators having generated more than their 
held access rights entitle them to 
Approved 
CAP163 Entry capacity sharing – permits different 
generators to exchange access rights between them 
without need for central facilitation, only 
notification; initially intended to be entirely free 
within pre-defined zones, but latterly accepted to 
be dependent on quoted node-to-node ‘exchange 
rates’. 
Approved 
CAP164 “Connect and manage” – finite duration access 
rights granted to relieve the access ‘queue’ with 
‘socialisation’ of additional system constraint costs 
while system reinforcements are undertaken 
Amended 
proposal 
approved 
CAP165 Finite long-term rights. Two forms were 
considered – rights for whatever period is applied 
for are granted upon commitment to pay use of 
system charges for that period; and a rolling 
commitment to paying charges in return for access 
rights, with a notice period long enough with 
respect to the current 5 days to give useful signals 
on need (or otherwise) for system reinforcement  
Discussion 
continuing  
on which 
form 
CAP166 Access auctions. Various forms have been 
suggested, centred around what terms are quoted 
in a bid – just the requested volume and a price; or 
volume, price and the duration for which the rights 
are sought; or volume, price, the duration and a 
price for which the party would be prepared to 
subsequently relinquish held rights (‘buyback’); or 
the last of these but with two rounds of auction 
giving the chance for revised bids; or the last form 
but with ‘use it or lose it’ provision 
All forms 
rejected 
except the 
last which is 
still under 
consideration 
 
The CUSC Panel, which is dominated by representatives of 
generation companies, has, however, been less welcoming of 
proposals for reform of longer-term access. One of the main 
subjects of concern to industry participants has been what 
rights might be inherited by existing parties. That is, under 
any particular reform, would existing generators that already 
have connection agreements or are already connected retain 
those rights? Different generating companies have then shown 
particular concerns about an auction process. For example, 
British Energy, which owns and operates the UK’s nuclear 
power stations, has queried the price it might have to pay to 
obtain sufficiently secure long-term rights to justify the high 
capital investment associated with new nuclear capacity. 
Renewables operators, on the other hand, might be expected 
to try to balance long-term and short-term rights but be 
concerned about exposure to high prices in the short-term 
markets [20]. 
A.  Links between transmission access reform revision of the 
security standard 
As outlined above, one of the aims of TAR has been to 
give clearer signals to the transmission owners on the need – 
or otherwise – for reinforcement of the system.  Beyond 
definition of how to distinguish ‘contributory’ from ‘non-
contributory’ generation, the present GB SQSS is silent on 
how a transmission planner should determine the 
‘background’ of generation capacity – how much, of what 
type and where it is located – against which the system is to 
be designed in accordance with the set criteria. The default 
approach would be to assume all those generators that have 
connection rights in a given future year are in the background 
and then to determine which are ‘contributory’, but, as noted 
above, generators can currently hold rights for future years 
without the associated commitment to pay for them in those 
years. This inevitably results in considerable uncertainty 
about which new generators will actually be connected in 
those years and which existing generators will still be 
operational [21]. In the 5-yearly ‘price reviews’ in which 
Ofgem determines the transmission owners’ income, based on 
assumptions about future operational and capital expenditure, 
this leads to difficulty for the transmission owners in 
justifying their plans. 
In contrast to present access arrangements, many of the 
various proposals for long-term access, by obliging user 
commitment to paying access charges for a significant period, 
promise to give greater certainty on the future generation 
‘background’ against which transmission should be planned. 
At time of writing, as well as final decisions being awaited 
from Ofgem (with the possibility of subsequent challenge by 
individual industry participants), the implementation details 
are yet to be worked out. Nevertheless, the greater certainty 
on generation background would seem to be something that 
can be usefully addressed in the present review of security 
standards. Whether or not there continues to be some set of 
straightforward ‘deterministic’ rules that stipulate required 
transfer capabilities based on a particular ‘background’, it is 
highly likely that recourse to explicit comparison of the 
economic benefits of additional system capacity in terms of 
avoided costs of system operation will still form at least part 
of a future standard. Proposed reform of short-term access 
may well also change the basis of such an evaluation 
significantly. Thus, it can be seen that there are quite close 
interactions between transmission access reform and review 
of the SQSS. 
VII.  DISCUSSION 
The main implications of present access arrangements for 
generators in Britain might be summarised as follows:  
• Once rights have been obtained, there is no risk 
associated with future denial of access; and future 
charges for access are highly predictable as a 
consequence of the present TNUoS charging 
methodology and the role played by Ofgem in regulating 
the transmission owners’ income. 
• In export constrained areas, the granting of new rights is 
conditional upon completion of system reinforcements 
which may lead to considerable delay to access. 
 7
This latter characteristic has been a key motivation for 
Ofgem and the UK government’s pursuit of reform of 
transmission access. However, all of the proposed reforms of 
long-term access must inevitably mean that generators’ risk in 
respect of connection in export constrained areas is increased, 
perhaps significantly. Generators might therefore be seen as 
having a choice between locating new facilities in areas of the 
system that are less constrained but perhaps less economically 
optimal from a production point of view, or simply bearing 
the increased risk of locating in the export constrained areas. 
Without adequate competition in generation, it seems 
inevitable that the increased costs associated with both of 
these would be passed on to the consumer although 
proponents of reform might argue that reform simply provides 
a much keener evaluation of the overall economics of 
production versus transmission2.  
An area in which Ofgem presently regards there to be 
scope for market power and inadequate competition is in 
balancing services for resolution of network constraints. 
Reform of system access may be expected to reduce this 
scope, as might a transition to some kind of ‘cost-reflective’ 
BSUoS charging3. Both of these changes might be expected to 
reduce the cost of constraints. 
A.  Generators’ responses to reform proposals 
In any reform of market arrangements, there will be some 
winners and some losers. It seems to have been generally 
assumed by generators that auctions of long-term access 
rights will increase both uncertainty and their costs, some 
more than others. If competitive pressures prevent these costs 
being passed on to consumers in full, generators’ resistance to 
radical reform of long-term access seems inevitable. In spite 
of Ofgem and the government’s avowed aim of reform being 
to facilitate the earlier connection of renewables, 
representatives of renewables developers are also generally 
opposing the various ideas put forward under CAP166. (They 
have long favoured “connect and manage” with ‘socialisation’ 
of increased constraint costs, which can be expected to be 
passed through to consumers). With the globalisation of 
energy and the largest generation developers having access to 
investment opportunities in many different countries, if 
increased costs of access cannot, at least in part, be passed on 
to consumers, some aspects of reform might make investment 
in development of renewables in Britain less attractive. 
A simple response to such concerns might be to argue that, 
if the consequence of a lack of transmission is reduced 
investment in renewables, then transmission should simply be 
built. (This might be justified, as noted in [11] and [21], on a 
                                                          
2 It might be noted that one of the conditions of the transmission owners’ 
licences in Britain is the facilitation of competition in generation. 
3 Through use of locational marginal pricing (LMP) in short-run markets, 
some other countries seem not to experience such difficulties. However, some 
industry players have long argued against adoption of such an arrangement in 
Britain, largely because of the difficulty of calculating LMP in an accurate 
manner that takes due account of the various corrective measures that the system 
operator takes to achieve system security at least cost, and of accurately 
representing voltage and stability constraints in a reliable software facility. 
‘least regret’ basis. Moreover, some observers point out that, 
according to figures Ofgem released in 2005, the cost of 
transmission at that time represented only 3% of a consumer’s 
electricity bill [22]). An alternative response might be to 
question the definition of ‘lack of transmission’. 
B.  Implications for transmission planning and operation 
A transmission investment planner’s aim  is to provide 
sufficient transmission capacity for the system to be operable 
in accordance with relevant operating standards. Moreover, 
such capacity should be provided as gives an overall 
economic balance between costs of system operation, the cost 
of transmission infrastructure and the consequences for 
consumers of loss of supply. The present ‘deterministic’ 
minimum transmission capacity on the main interconnected 
system in Britain is based on an implicit balance between 
those factors that some argue is no longer valid. An explicit 
evaluation of such a balance would, however, depend on a 
large of set variables and assumptions for the values of those 
variables that might be hard to justify in a planning enquiry 
when seeking consents for a new transmission line. 
It was noted above that sufficient transmission capacity 
should be provide for the system to be operated in accordance 
with operating standards. It might be asked whether those 
standards are unduly restrictive on the power transfers that 
can be accommodated on the system. Some participants in 
industry workshops have been suggesting reform to the 
operational criteria to reduce the need for transmission 
capacity with, at one extreme, the proposal that conventional 
security rules such as ‘N-1’ are thrown away and reliance put 
on ‘real-time’ probabilistic assessments of risk. Such 
proposals might be supported by pointing towards ‘smart 
grids’ principles in which, in the not too distant future, ‘smart 
meters’ will enable active control of demand at low cost. In 
the short term, however, while increments to transmission 
unreliability might have minimal effects on the reliability of 
supply experienced by individual consumers (since most 
unreliability is experienced as a consequence of distribution 
outages), the political acceptability of greater numbers of 
‘major unreliability events’ affecting very large numbers of 
consumers at a time is open to question. In addition, system 
operators might be concerned about their liabilities in the 
absence of clear rules against which, after a major system 
incident, it might be determined whether they took – or failed 
to take – appropriate action. 
It has been argued that reform of transmission access 
would provide greater certainty for many of the variables that 
are inputs to a cost-benefit analysis of transmission 
investment proposals and reduce the need for transmission 
planners to make judgments. However, how much 
transmission capacity is really available for offer within an 
auction process is difficult to determine, particularly for a 
meshed network that experiences a wide range of power flows 
that arise in the course of a year of operation as a 
consequence of demand variation, different despatches of 
generation and the need to take transmission outages for 
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maintenance or construction work. The quote of a single 
‘availability capacity’ depends on some assumptions about 
that range of power flows (though this would be helped by a 
two round auction such as suggested in one of the recent 
alternative amendment proposals for CAP166). With the 
transmission licensees still having a licence obligation 
towards the planning and operation of ‘economic and 
efficient’ transmission, and with the expectation that not all 
generators will buy all the access rights they require in long-
term auctions, the transmission licensees might also need to 
make judgements on whether to build sufficient transmission 
to accommodate all the granted long-term rights without any 
network constraints (which is not done now) or some 
proportion of those rights on the grounds that they will not 
always be exploited (and could be sold in short-term access 
markets if ‘spare’ transmission capacity is available at 
different times of the year). It might be argued instead that the 
amount of transmission built should simply reflect revenues 
from the long-term auctions, though it may also be observed 
that revenues from such auctions are often maximised by 
limiting the available capacity. 
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has outlined the current situation in Great 
Britain where the Scottish and UK governments’ ambitions to 
meet a significant proportion of future energy needs with 
reneweable energy has, with the incentive provided by the 
‘renewables obligation’, attracted considerable interest from 
developers in building and connecting wind farms to the 
transmission system in the north. However, the northern part 
of the GB transmission system is already heavily constrained. 
This and the consequential delays to system access have led to 
proposals for reform of the GB ‘Security and Quality of 
Supply Standard’ that drives transmission development for a 
given ‘background’ of generation capacity and of the means 
by which generators gain and pay for access rights.  
The main issues under discussion have been described. 
While there is consensus among industry participants, the 
regulator and the UK and Scottish governments that change is 
needed to better facilitate the exploitation of the renewable 
resource, it has been shown that there remain complex 
questions of implementation to be resolved. These include 
whether auctions for access should take place and how they 
might be organised alongside trading of short-term rights, 
whether security standards should be relaxed and how ‘market 
signals’ might be better used in future to drive investment in 
transmission. 
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